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Abstract 
In this article, it is argued that the right to secede represents a political act and both 
necessarily and multilaterally, a right to secede is a right to territory. Next, to tackle 
the trouble related to secession, some normative strategies on nationalist concerns of 
secession are suggested. Moreover, an institutional argument of the Remedial Right 
Theories is criticized and a noninstitutional argument against unilateral or consensual 
secession is presented. Lastly, the legal aspect of this theory will be discussed 
philosophically. Well, what is wrong with secession? 
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Multilateral, neither Unilateral nor Bilateral 
The writer would argue that for some countries and nations, it is morally unbearable 
to tolerate both consensual and unilateral rights to secede.2  Nonetheless, the theory 
could be morally defensible iff a theory of secession normatively would be 1. 
philosophically all-things-considered 2. a premise for other philosophical, political, 
and legal arguments, 3. other various countries and nations require the theory both 
theoretically and practically. 3&4 Straightforwardly, the right to secede is the right to 
secede as a right to territory:5 
 
1 I (hereafter: The writer) would like to thank some activists who have been providing critique of the 
writer's thoughts, during these years. Likewise, the writer is indebted to philosophers, social and 
political scientists and legal scholars who directly sent their works to the writer. Lastly, this article is 
dedicated to the people of writer's country. The writer's mail: lotfiyazdi@gmail.com 
2 The writer's footnote: There are two methodological notes: Before all else, the normativity of secession 
represents the realm of philosophers and my theory (hereafter: The theory) which is a pure 
philosophical theory on secession in itself, and it is not an empirical debate (except these 
footnotes:11,14,15,22). Moreover, this article allows only four types of sentences: 1. the writer's 
innovative ideas, 2. quotations, 3. interpretations, and 4. Footnotes. The writer has named this 
methodology "Microscopic Analyticity " which means Philosophy is not a game. 
3 For possibility of secession, see: (Glaser, 2003), (Buchanan, 1991a:332-9), (Lindsay & Wellman, 
2003b:115-20), (Abbott in Lehning Ed., 1998), (Beran, 1983), (Ker-Lindsay, 2014). 
The writer's footnote: The writer is an anti-secessionist, to be precise, the writer very hardly tolerates 
secession. 
4  For generalization in secession, see: (Corlett, 1998:123-4). 
5 For the right to secede as a right to territory, see: (Brilmayer, 1991, 2000), (Buchanan, 1991b:11,24, 
2017a), (Wellman, 1995:144-5), the opposite view (Caney in Lehning, Ed., 1998:151). 
"A theory of secession necessarily depends upon a theory of legitimate sovereignty over 
territory." (Brilmayer, 1991, p. 199) 
The writer will put forward this quotation as the core idea of secession. Without this 
clarification, secession is a fallacious political concept which makes it 
indistinguishable from other political concepts. For instance,6 a/some group(s) 
withdraw(s) from an existing state and constitute(s) an independent state so that we 
can consider them secessionists. Consequently, those secessionists would like to 
maintain their state without the interference of other people who may or may not 
inhabit the corresponding territory. Additionally, it is true that they probably do not 
insist on overthrowing the current state; however, without territorial withdrawal, 
those acts could be partially recognized overthrowing a state and building up a new 
state. This means that, withdrawing from and overthrowing a state without a territory 
can be identified as a revolution.7 Therefore, every unique secessionist act necessarily 
has to consider a right to secede territorially. Nevertheless, territorial claims are about 
current claims of territory, but territorial concerns of secession are precisely about 
changing the territories and requiring some actions for the future of those 
territories. In this case, it is neither unilateral nor bilateral. The right is not legally or 
politically a relation between a state and secessionists. Conversely, secessionists, 
remainders and the state altogether comprise the segments of the relation. 
Ontologically, this relation would represent the first-order relation, and by adding up 
international institutions, incomers, and refugees, then the new relation is known as a 
second-order one. In other words, the former draws the relation as a triangular or 
more accurately, multilateral normative political fact which has connections between 
the sides.  
Well, Imagine those territories without an established state that straddles the borders; 
individuals who inhabit a territory ought to contribute to the territory as a 
whole.8 Contribution to the territory endures an intuitional idea that every particular 
citizen possesses the same right as the other citizens of a country where each 
centimeter does not belong to private ownership. For example, a northern citizen of a 
country who owns her house in a northern city asserts no right regarding a street in 
her neighborhood more than a southern citizen who possesses her house and other 
properties in a southern city of that country. This example also has a legal dimension 
which shows that when a citizen is a foreigner, she does not have the same right in 
regards to the abovementioned street as she has to obtain official permission to enter 
other counties.  
The territorial concerns of secession were discussed in the first part of the theory. 
Some potential reproofs will be presented in the next paragraphs. 
The first reproof is that understanding the right to secede as a right to territory has to 
be multilateralism, except the cases such as usurpation by foreigners, annexation, 
 
6  For similar analysis, see: (Buchanan, 1991a:326-7, 1991b:10). 
7 For secession and other political concepts, see: secession and/or intervention (Roth, 2015), (Fabry, 
2013:94-100), and/or revolution (Buchanan, 1991a:326-7, 1991b:10, 2017b), and/or civil disobedience 
(Buchanan, 1991b:10), and/or emigration (ibid:10-2), (Beran, 1977:266) and/or referendum (Pavkovic, 
2004:702-4), (Jovanovic, 2007:171,184-94), (Kymlicka, 2000:221-2). 
8 For secession and territorial rights, see: (Wellman, 1995:150-64), (Brilmayer, 2015), (Buchanan in 
Moore and Buchanan Eds., 2003:232), territory as whole (ibid:234-5). 
colonization, and occupation. By these exclusions, a multilateral territory is a joint 
land or equity sharing9 which is morally and fairly the right for those who live in or 
beyond those arguable territories and boundaries that are noncolonial.  
Let the writer insist on another reproof, which demonstrates that there is no 
correlation between one's private property and owning a public park or seaside which 
is located near one's home. States do not permit to exchange those legitimate places as 
they belong to all the citizens of the country. Multilateral decisions should be made as 
they are considered equity sharing properties. For instance, a person could be born in 
a house near the sea or the desert by chance; therefore, this fact leads us to know that 
the right to secede as a right to territory is a public right. The writer partially agrees 
that in case we privatized the land exclusively10, we could acknowledge the right to 
secede as a right to territory unilaterally or bilaterally; whereas, interestingly the 
weakness of Libertarian views in social and political philosophy has been recognized. 
Furthermore, focusing on territory only from its economic aspect is equal to ignoring 
some of its moral aspects. In the next sections, one of the moral features of territory 
called Martyr Argument will be argued.11 
Here is one more reproof that the right to secede is not only a fabulous solution of the 
legitimacy of boundaries, territorial struggles and debates, but also, in most situations, 
it is an abysmal solution: 
"Secession would not be a way of rectifying boundaries, because there are no truly natural 
boundaries … A secession or partition converts a domestic ethnic dispute into a more dangerous 
international one" (Horowitz, 2003b, p. 10) 
It should be mentioned that natural boundaries can be formed when the whole people 
of a country participate in a political or semi-political action and they name themselves 
as people of a country or a nation. Accordingly, there could be natural boundaries to 
avoid secessionist incentives.12 Remember that state of a particular territory does not 
have to be a colonial one. In any case, for the natural or unnatural boundaries of every 
country, secession is permissible only in the theory.  
All in all, does the right to secede, ipso facto, as a right to territory which is multilateral, 
create a trade-off among nation? 
 
9 For equity sharing, see: (Christiano, 2006:97-9), (Haeri Yazdi, 1994), (Kant, 1996:416-9), (Stilz, 
2009:198-210). 
The writer's footnote: The writer follows the idea of equity sharing as a basis for the right to secede as a 
right to territory. 
10 For the proponent of this view, see: (Rothbard in Gordon Ed., 1998:84). 
11 For various definitions of martyrdom, see: (Luban in Besson & Tasioulas, Eds., 2010:577), (Tamir in 
McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997:230), (Hirschman, 1970:126). 
The writer's footnote: First of all, the thought of Martyr Argument came to the writer's mind in a 
discussion some years ago, and the writer had to present a pure ethical argument without referring to a 
culture, history and heritage. In addition, the writer has studied the Hirschman's definition very 
recently and the writer thinks that Hirschman would claim that there is a similarity between martyrdom 
and secession and both of them are remorseless. However, the writer will argue that secession is 
normatively based on the Martyr Argument. 
12 For secession and boundaries, see: (Christiano, 2006). 
 Understanding the Heterogeneous Ethnic Nationalism or Civic-
Territorial Nationalism 
To avoid secession, we have to reevaluate the relationship between nationalism and 
secession in different political systems, such as unitary or federal states.13 
The first plan is to ask why we have to recognize the challenges of a country or a group 
of countries that roughly and culturally have reciprocal relations with each other; and 
identify them as global struggles which may or may not be considered as other 
countries' problems in the future and which are unfair. The secessionist advocacy is an 
unforgivable, unforgettable and deplorable decision to make for the latter countries as 
we ought not to interfere in those theoretically or practically as it meddles with 
imperialistic liberal or illiberal wrapping.14 
The second policy is representing the truth that heterogeneous citizens in particular 
realms have also made their countries heterogeneous.15 Open-mindedness toward 
nationhood means considering it as a collection of races, religions, languages, 
ethnicities, customs, traditions, and histories, and therefore, this collection plays a 
tremendous description of the nationhood. It is undisputedly ironic if the critics 
eliminate this nationhood and interpret ethnic nationalism16 only as a homogenous 
concept. Said otherwise, inclusive explanation of nationhood has to face some 
normative definitions of nationhood that define it as a heterogeneous nation in those 
countries that reasonably call and identify themselves as a nation. It is advisable to 
include other types of nationalities like civic-territorial; otherwise, it will be a doubtful 
and disputable meaning of nationhood. There are countries where nationhood is 
merely constructed by the differences among their people that they call themselves a 
nation. Nations are not only purely cultural-genetic, but also social-political. By adding 
up civic-territorial nationalism on the one side and heterogenous ethnic nationalism 
on the other side, the definition of nationhood could conceal all of the nations, 
normatively. Nonetheless, for these nationalities, overthrowing the democratic states, 
infringing different citizens’ rights, defaming the dissimilar civilizations, and ceding 
the lands of other countries to be independent, irredenta and imperiling are 
undeniably immoral. You can call these tactics and strategies as destroying different 
magnificent civilizations or thwarting their accomplishments and 
developments.  Technically, if nationalism is built by ethnicity, it would be called 
 
13 For secession and federalism, see: (Norman, 2006:77-173), (Jovanovic, 2007:64-79), (Kymlicka in 
Lehning Ed., 1998:135-8, 2000:213-6, in He & Galligan & Inoguchi Eds., 2007:45-6), (Bauböck, 
1997:20-32). 
14 For similar empirical view, see: (Chandhoke, 2014b:51). 
The writer's footnote: The writer's country is an exceptionally suitable example to know that how a 
country has been devastated by the all of permanent secessionist temptations of some countries.  
15 For empirical heterogeneity, see: (Van Dyke in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:52), (Smith, 1998:40), (Horowitz, 
1985:267-72, 2003a:53-5). 
16 For civic-territorial nationalism and ethnic nationalism, see: (Liu, 2016:373), (Sorens, 2008:327), 
(Norman, 2006:57-66), (Miller, 1995:188-9), (Gans, 2003:7-29), (Smith, 1991:82-3,117-9), (Coppieters 
in Coppieters & Sakwa Eds., 2003:9-10), (Gilbert in Lehning Ed., 1998:207-8), (Spencer & Wollman, 
2002:101-5), (Kymlicka in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997:64-5). 
ethnic nationhood: Homogeneous and heterogeneous. If nationalism is built up by 
civic-territorial strategies, it would be called civic-territorial nationhood. In other 
words, a nation could be the former or the latter. Precisely, there can be the models of 
nationhood: 1. Heterogeneous ethnic nationhood (that heterogeneity is undoubtedly 
polyethnic), 2. Heterogeneous civic-territorial nationhood (that heterogeneity could 
be polyethnic or multinational), 3.  Homogenous nationhood (There is no difference 
between homogenous civic-territorial nationhood and homogenous ethnic nationhood 
in homogenous nationhood. From a philosophical point of view, both of them lead to 
the same meaning; therefore, there is no variation between them in terms of content; 
plus, our concern is regarding the humankind, whose rights are the same in both of 
them). The key difference between polyethnic and multinational nationhood is that 
polyethnic nations have a common heritage and/or history with each other and/or 
identify themselves as a nation; however, in multinational nationhood, there is no 
such relation. 
The third initiative to block secession is first of all, to preserve ancient countries as an 
antiquity as they represent common heritages of human being. Next, if there are any 
differences in any territory, we ought to meticulously construct that nationhood 
because of the normative fact that it is parallel with the human values, which is much 
valuable for an unplanned pluralistic nation.17  
Consequently, it was the second part of the theory that has been overlapped with 
nationalism. There are some worries about this overlapping that will be demonstrated 
in the following paragraphs.  
The writer recommends that the first negative aspect of this overlapping is forgetting 
differential nationalities. A prima facie reason to pluralistic nationalities is the burden 
of our obligation that is not endangering them, especially the inheritances. A 
philosopher concedes that: 
"The lamentable fact is that until very recently there have been almost no serious attempts to 
develop democratic states that recognize a plurality of nations within them" (Buchanan, 2004, 
p. 392)  
The writer whole-heartedly confirms that states have to legally and practically respect 
human rights of citizens of a heterogeneous or homogenous country as an ethnic 
nation or a civic-territorial nation. It should be noted that interpreting nationhood as 
only homogenous is not sufficient and only recognizing this kind of nationalism is 
hegemonic.  
The second objection is that if there is a primary relation between nations and their 
territories which would emerge from human rights, then the human rights of those 
who have been indigenous in some territories conquered by newcomers should not be 
violated.18 It is a normative strategy based on justice,19 and it is thought to compensate 
for  the rights of people if it is the matter of distributive justice or regaining their 
 
17  For some objections against civic-territorial nationalism, see: (Norman, 2006:60-1). 
18 For secession and violence, see: (Buchanan, 2017a), (Pavkovic, 2008:28-31), (Horowitz, 2003b:5-6), 
(Berkebile, 2017), (Jovanovic, 2007:x-xii). 
19 For secession and territorial justice, see: (Buchanan, 1991b:114-24, 2017a), (Miller, 1997:277-81), 
(Catala, 2017), (Dietrich, 2013). 
territories if it is about retributive justice. The writer thinks of this strategy as more 
respectful compared to advocating and operating a movement on secession in ancient 
countries.   
Another objection is that if someone prevents these moderately valuable attitudes 
toward differential nationalities, parochialism and tribalism20 would emerge:  
"The most devastating objection against nationalist thesis is its tendency to exclude n0n-
members … this form of a state will be a "tribal" state" (Chandhoke, 2008, p. 11) 
It is thinkable that we should perceive this quotation as a general reproof to any 
fundamental theses that would understand the right to secede based on nationalist 
claims, especially the homogenous ones. Normatively, it is not possible for some 
countries with a hundred ethnicities to run secession that is constructed by the 
falsehood of parochialism and tribalism.21 
Another burning question is raised here and that is whether there is homogeneity that 
we should morally destroy and re-build with heterogeneous nationhood or it is 
naturally preferable to have a homogenous nationhood to tackle those secessionist 
incentives.  One of the answers to this question is that normatively, there is no such 
nationhood that could remain a blocker to avoid secessionists’ incentives because 
every single difficulty of the heterogeneous nationhood could emerge for the 
homogenous one.22 
More accurately, why the contribution of territory represents an intuitional fact that 
supports the right to secede as a right to territory multilaterally? 
Remedial Cure for Remedial Situations of Unilateral or Consensual 
Cases of Secession (RCRSUCCS) 
The primary right theories23 have played an important role in infringing the 
remainders' rights.24 Identical properties of a person individualistically or a group of 
 
20 For tribal nationalism, see: (Glover in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997:11-30), (Popper, 1966), 
(Brilmayer, 2000:285-6). 
21  For some arguments of similar view, see: (Midtgaard, 2007:303-8). 
22 For the same empirical claim, see: (Sorens, 2014:270). 
23 For the Primary Right Theories, see: (Buchanan, 1997b:35, in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003:248, in 
Goodin et al Eds., 2007:758), (Brando & Morales-Gálvez, 2018:4-8), Hybrid Theories (Pavkovic, 
2000:488-9), (Pérez & Sanjaume, 2013:5). 
24 For objections against the Primary Right Theories, see: (Buchanan, 1997b:44-60), 1. The New Set 
Minority Problem (Horowitz in Moore Ed., 1998:199), (Lister, 2016:154-6), 2. The Global Anarchy 
Problem (Buchanan, 1991b:102-4), 3. The Soft Paternalism Problem (Buchanan, 1991b:101) (Pavkovic, 
2003:75), on The Liberal Paradox (Buchanan, 1991b:34-5), 4. The Non-Seceding Part Problem 
(Pavkovic, 2004:696), The Supermajority Reply (Antic, 2007:153-5), 5. The Erga Omnes Problem (Day, 
2012:29), 6. The Domino Theory Problem (Beran, 1984:29-30), reply (Caney in Lehning, Ed., 1998:169-
70), 7. The Strategic Bargaining Problem (Buchanan, 1991b:100, in Moore Ed., 1998a:21), reply (Boykin 
in Gordon Ed. 1998:69-70), 8. Compensation Problem (Buchanan, 1991b:104-14), reply (Gauthier, 
1994:365-7), (Nielsen, 1993:36), 9. Problems of Self-Determination (Brilmayer, 1991:184,192-3), 
(Vidmar, 2010:37-8), (Hannum, 1998:776,779), (Buchanan in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:352, 2004:332), 
citizens collectively are their instrument to become an integral identity, to be as a 
bearer of the right to secede. There are two important different views of the Primary 
Right Theories that:  
On the one side, there is/are a/some feature(s) that primarily has/have made a group's 
willingness as a right to secede that is/are the Ascriptivist Right Theories.25 
Nonetheless, there are some arguments against these theories that the writer thinks 
that ignoring a territory multilaterally, the Chandhoke and the writer of this study's 
thoughts on nationalism, and the RCRSUCCS are those significant arguments.26  The 
most important interpretation of this theory is the Nationalist Right Theories, based 
on which the right to secede could be true iff a group of those who objectively and/or 
subjectively identify themselves as a nation and/or an encompassing group decide to 
withdraw their rights from territory unilaterally and have a desire to construct a state 
and govern themselves, independently.27  
 
(Chandhoke, 2008:18-9), (Kymlicka in Besson & Tasioulas Eds., 2010:384), reply (Copp in McKim and 
McMahan Eds., 1997:281-2). 
25 For the Ascriptivist Right Theories, see: (Margalit & Raz, 1990), (Caney, 1997, in Lehning, Ed., 1998), 
(Moore 1997, in Moore Ed., 1998a:2,7, in Moore Ed. 1998b, 2000, 2001, 2006), (Nielsen, 1993, in 
Moore Ed., 1998), (Miller, 1995, 1997, in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003). 
26 For objections against the Ascriptivist Right Theories, see: 1. Overlapping Problem (Moore, 1997:910-
2), 2. Strife Problem (Vidmar, 2010:37), (Buchanan, 2017a), reply (Catala, 2013:80-3), 3. Infeasibility 
Objection (Buchanan in Couture, Nielsen & Seymour Eds., 1998c:291-3, 2004:382), (Bauböck, 
1997:10), (Norman in Moore Ed., 1998:36), (Moore in Moore Ed., 1998b:138) 4. The Equal Respect 
Objection (Wellman in Frey & Wellman Eds., 2003:268-9), (Brilmayer, 2000:285), (Bauböck, 1997:5-
6), (Buchanan in Couture, et al Eds., 1998c:293-9), 5. The Polyethnic Rights Objection and Vanity 
Secession (Kymlicka, 2000:215-6), (Buchanan in Couture, et al Eds., 1998c:300-1), 6. The Nation 
Concept Problem (Chandhoke, 2014a:5-6), (Philpott, 1995:365), 7. Problems of National Self-
Determination: (Buchanan, 1991a:328-9, 1998c:299-307), Paradoxes (Slattery, 1994:710-2), 
Irrelevancy (Chandhoke, 2014a:9), (Copp, 1979:71-3), e.g. Jihadis (Chandhoke, 2014a:7), e.g. Nazis 
(Buchanan, 1991b:56), Non Sequitur (Norman in Moore Ed., 1998:36), Cycle of Violence (Jenne, 
2006:29), Indeterminacy Problem (Moore, 1997:905-7), (Sorens, 2014:270), The Balkan Objection 
(De-shalit, 1996:916-20), (Miller in Matravers and Pike Eds, 2003:312-4), 8. Instability Problem 
(Moore, 1997:907-10, in Moore Ed., 1998a:4), (Bauböck, 1997:4), 9. Patriotism Problem (ibid:6-8). 
27 For the arguments for the Ascriptivist Right Theories and the related replies, see: (Moore, 2000:239-
41), 1. The Culture Goods Argument and its weaknesses (Philpott, 1995:373-4), (Miller in Moore & 
Buchanan Eds., 2003:269-70), (Buchanan in ibid:249-51), 2. Non-Institutional Argument and its 
weaknesses (Lee, 2015), 3. Identity Argument and its weaknesses (Lee, 2012), (Moore, 2000:240-4), 
(Weinstock, 2000:254-6), 4. Instrumental Argument and its weakness (Buchanan in Moore and 
Buchanan Eds., 2003:251-2, 2004:388-92), (Wellman, 2005:38-9), (Lee, 2019), reply (Caney in 
Lehning Ed.,  1998:155-7), 5. The Kantian Argument and its weaknesses (ibid:158-60), 6. Well-Being 
Argument and its possible reply (Caney, 1997:361-9, in Lehning, Ed., 1998:161-7), 7. Rousseauean 
Argument and its weaknesses (ibid:167), 8. The Distributive Justice Argument (Miller, 1997:277-81), 
reply (Caney in Lehning, Ed., 1998:168-9), (Weinstock, 2000:256-7), 9. The Encompassing Group 
Argument (Margalit & Raz, 1990) reply (Buchanan, 1997b:54-5), (Kapitan, 2008), 10. Divorce Analogy 
Argument (Nielsen, 1993:35-6), reply (Blahuta, 2001), (Ewin, 1994:350), (Aronovitch, 2000:29-31). 
Moreover, the writer believes that the other types of the Ascriptive Right Theories like 
Communitarian Right Theories28 have suffered from the same weaknesses; therefore, 
it does not matter if one insists on other identities or not. 
On the other side, Plebiscitarian Right Theories explain that an individual or a group 
of people have the secession right iff they represent their willingness through a/some 
plebiscitary political act(s).29 At first, these theories appear to be more interesting than 
the Ascriptivist Right Theories because they are based on democratic values such as 
consent or association, and therefore, perhaps proponents of these theories ponder on 
the opponents who appear to be eleutherophobic.30 Although those are anarchically 
chaotic, democratically arbitrary and dramatically inapplicable; multilateral aspects of 
territory and RCRSUCCS are sufficient to defeat these theories.31  
In addition, other interpretations like Republican Right Theories32 have focused on 
the non-domination freedom and have presented the right to secede as a solution of 
arbitrary domination of political power although they replace the willingness of 
freedom with the willingness of association or consent. They would not get this point 
that a country is a multilateral territory and it is owned by the people of that country 
as a whole, and only the RCRSUCCS is advisable.  
 
28 For the Communitarian Right Theories as the Ascriptivist Right Theories, see: (Pavkovic, 2003:79-
80), (Gilbert in Lehning Ed., 1998). 
29 For the Plebiscitarian Right Theories, see: (Beran, 1977:266, 1983, 1984, 1988, 1992:253, 1993:484, 
in Lehning Ed., 1998), (Philpott, 1995, in Moore Ed., 1998), (Wellman, 1995, 2005), (Altman & 
Wellman, 2009:43-68), (Gauthier, 1994), (Lefkowitz, 2008), (Copp in McKim and McMahan Eds.,1997, 
1998), (Reinikainen, 2019:10-5), (Cavallero, 2017:128-31,135-9). 
30 For arguments for the Plebiscitarian Right Theories and the related replies, see: 1. The Value of 
Political Self-Determination Argument (Wellman, 2005:34-64), (Altman & Wellman, 2009:44-8), 
(Cavallero, 2017:133-4), its reply (Buchanan in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:352, 2004:332-3), 2. Consent 
Argument (Beran, 1984:23-7, 1988:317-8), reply (Caney in Lehning, Ed.,  1998a:151-54), (Buchanan, 
1991a:328, 1991b:70-3, in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:369-73, in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997a:314-5, in 
Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003:253-4), (Birch, 1984) (Brilmayer, 1991:184-5), (Wellman, 1995:155-6, 
2005:8-9,17), (Dowding in Lehning Ed., 1998:77), (Altman & Wellman, 2009:49-50), 3. The 
Democratic Value Argument: As a majority (Philpott, 1995:355-62), its reply (Buchanan in Moore Ed., 
1998a:19-20), as an equal respect (Copp in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997:277-300), reply (Buchanan 
in Moore Ed., 1998a:20-1, in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003:256-7), (Cavallero, 2017:132-3), 4. The 
Freedom of Association Argument (Gauthier, 1994), (Lefkowitz, 2008:496-500), its reply (Wellman, 
2005:16-7), (Cavallero, 2017:131-2), as The Pro Tanto Defence Argument (Cavallero, 2017:134-9),  reply 
(Buchanan, 2017a), 5. Samaritanism Argument (Wellman, 2005:11-25,55-8), its reply (Lefkowitz, 
2008:494-6), 6. Divorce Analogy Argument (Gauthier, 1994), reply (Blahuta, 2001), (Aronovitch, 
2000:29-31). 
31 For objections against the Plebiscitarian Right Theories, see: (Sorens, 2014:269-74), (Beran in 
Lehning Ed., 2005:46-55), (Moore, 2000:232-9), 1. The Domino Theory Problem (Patten, 2002:559), 
(Beran, 1984:29-30), (Kamanu, 1974:366-70), reply (Caney in Lehning Ed., 1998:169-70), 2. The 
Equality and Democracy Conflict Problem (Patten, 2002:573-5), 3. The Global Anarchy Problem 
(Philpott, 1995:355), 4. The Dissenters Problem  (Philpott, 1995:378-80), 5. The New Set Minority 
Problem (McGee, 1994:27), (Sorens, 2014:274-5), 6. The Open Borders Problem and its reply (Rothbard 
in Gordon Ed., 1998:84-8), 7. The Self-Determination Character Problem (Altman & Wellman, 
2009:48-50), 8. Hirschman's Argument (Buchanan in Moore Ed., 1998a:22), 9. The Irrelevancy to 
Territorial Claims Problem (Catala, 2015:588-94). 
32 For the Republican Right Theories as the Plebiscitarian Right Theories, see: (Pérez Lozano, 2014). 
Next, other interpretations such as Libertarian Right Theories were embodied by not 
only the core weaknesses of other Plebiscitarian Right Theories, but also the general 
agreement on the unsolvable problems of Libertarian views and reducing the values of 
territory to its economic affairs.33  
The second group of theories is the Remedial Right Theories34 that completely 
outweigh the Primary Right Theories.35 They are considered the well-settled 
theories.36 Nonetheless, the writer’s view is that presenting the leading 
noninstitutional deontological reason is essential for the theory to criticize an 
institutional remedial one.37 
 
33 For the Libertarian Right Theories as the Plebiscitarian Right Theories, see: (Kreptul, 2003), 
(Rothbard in Gordon Ed., 1998), (McGee, 1994). 
34 For the Remedial Right Theories, see: (Buchanan, 1991b, 1997b:34-5, in Moore Ed., 1998a:25, in 
Lehning Ed., 1998b:228-31, in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003:247-8, 2004:367, in Petit Ed., 2007:758, 
2014:19-20, 2017a), (Seymour, 2007), (Birch, 1984), (Kamanu, 1974:361-2), (Chandhoke, 2014a:6-7, 
2014b:69), (Brilmayer, 1991, 2000), (Norman in Moore Ed., 1998, 2006), (Christiano, 2006:99-100), 
(Hannum, 1998:776-9). 
35 For the arguments for the Remedial Right Theories and the related replies, see: (Buchanan, 1991b, 
2004:369-71, 2017a), (Norman in Moore Ed., 1998:41), 1. Rectifying Past injustices Argument 
(Brilmayer, 1991:189-92), (Buchanan, 1991b:67-70, in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:367-9, 2004:355-7, in 
Goodin et al Eds., 2007:758-9, 2017a), reply (Bishai in Lehning Ed., 1998:96-7), (Philpott, 1995:376), 
(Miller in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003:268), (Catala, 2013:77-9), 2. The Cultural Preservation 
Argument (Buchanan, 1991b:52-64, in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:355-64), (Hannum, 1998:776-7), reply 
(Corlett, 1998:121), 3. Self-defense Argument (Buchanan in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:364-7, 1997b:37, in 
Goodin et al Eds., 2007:759-60), reply (Bishai in Lehning Ed., 1998:96), 4. The Discriminatory 
Redistribution Argument (Buchanan, 1991a:330-1, 1991b:38-45, in McKim and McMahan Eds., 
1997a:312-3, in Goodin et al Eds., 2007:760-2), reply (ibid), (Bishai in Lehning Ed., 1998:97-8), 5. The 
Violations of Intrastate Autonomy Argument (Buchanan, 2004:357-9), its weakness (Buchanan, 
2014:16-7), 6. Permanent Minority Argument and its problem (Buchanan, 2004:360-3). 
The writer's footnote: The writer disagrees with The Cultural Preservation Argument because there is 
no possible danger for the minority cultures in a heterogeneous nationalism or civic-territorial 
nationalism; moreover, the Discriminatory Redistribution Argument, the Violations of Intrastate 
Autonomy Argument and the Permanent Minority Argument are too problematic to be considered as a 
premise for the right to secede. Furthermore, the writer has revised the Remedial Right Theories as 
RCRSUCCS; Therefore, we have to care about the arguments associated with this theory. 
36 For similar view, see: (Wellman, 2006), (Norman, 2003:198). 
37   For objections against the Remedial Right Theories, see: 1. The Blameless Dissenter Problem (Lister, 
2016:161-2), 2. The Violence Paradox (Costa, 2003:83-4), 3. The Doctrine of Self-Determination 
Problem (Buchheit, 1978:223), its reply (Buchanan, 2004:372, 2017a), (Brilmayer, 2000:284), 4. Statist 
Problem and its reply (Buchanan, 2004:371-2), 5- The Arbitrary and Internally Inconsistent Problem 
(Catala, 2017), 6- The  Group Problem (Brando & Morales-Gálvez, 2018:3).  
The writer's footnote: Look at the rest of this article for replies to the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th objections 
against this theory. 
Some contemporary writers have argued for an institutional democratic right to 
secede,38 and some of them have reflected it in their works.39 Allen Buchanan argues 
that: 
"1. … secession from a legitimate state is impermissible. 2. A state is legitimate if and only if it 
is democratic (and respects human rights). 3. (Therefore) Secession from a democratic (human 
rights-respecting) state is impermissible (except in cases where there is a negotiated secession 
or secession as the result of the exercise of a constitutional right) … democratic institutions … 
block secessionist claims" (Buchanan in Moore Ed., 1998, p. 29-30) 
There is no doubt that democracy is instrumentally and valuably the most high-quality 
political system among current political styles even though there are some 
misunderstandings. First of all, the lack or shortage of democratic rights does not in 
itself contain a permission to withdraw a territorial right unilaterally. It means that we 
have to strive for a democratic state that should include the other reasonable moral 
rights. In brief, a right to retain this reasonable political state with a democratic 
constitution and respecting other human rights is a right for different particular states. 
It is our moral and political duty to establish this political system. A right to this or 
that state is not a right to this or that territory, unilaterally. Needless to say, there is a 
correlation between a right to secede as a right to territory and a right to democracy 
because a right to secede concludes a right to territory and a right to a new independent 
state. Conversely, there is a partial overlapping between a right to secede and a right 
to democracy. Imagine that A is a territory that includes three parts; J, K, and L, and 
the political system by which A is governed is a dictatorship. Every distinct act of 
people of K who are fascinated by the undeniable democratic values to overthrow the 
dictator state and replace it with a democratic system shows their striving to be a 
moderate state and not an independent state. Next, having a pure and non-
independent right to a state does not equal having a right to a territory. It is clear that 
if one enjoys a moral right which is prohibited because of the existing dictatorship, the 
dictatorship infringes one's moral right; but it is not inherently permitted that 
someone can withdraw one's rights of territory unilaterally. It ought to be decided 
multilaterally, e.g. as the RCRSUCCS. If a person does not care about this permitted 
situation, every unique act of K for a right to democracy that will produce an 
independent state and a right to that territory will violate the J and L's moral rights. 
People of A as a whole should endeavor to be volunteers for a democratic state and 
avoid this or that independent state.  
Moreover, imagine a situation in which a group of people who had been living in a 
territory with other groups of people for thousands of years and owned a state which 
had a low or medium-level quality of democratic values for a hundred years, then they 
lost their democracy and they live in a nondemocratic state now. This situation never 
means that that group is allowed to secede except in the RCRSUCCS. Practically and 
intrinsically, it is ridiculous to abandon those hundred years of a democratic state and 
become hopeless.  
 
38 For the institutional aspects of secession, see: (Buchanan, 1997b:31-4, 2004:345-8, 2017a), (Norman 
in Moore Ed., 1998:44-54), (Wellman, 2005:157-80), (Seymour, 2007), (Altman & Wellman, 2009:54-
8), (Philpott, 2000:114-5), (Lefkowitz, 2018), ideal and non- ideal theory (Lee, 2015), (Buchanan, 
1991a:324-6, 1997b:61, Lehning Ed., 1998b:249-50, 2004:346), (Bauböck, 1997:12-13), (Nielsen in 
Moore Ed., 1998:130-2), (Wellman, 2005:168-172). 
39 For the Buchanan's criticizing the Philpott & Copp's theorizing, see: (Buchanan in Moore Ed., 
1998:16-21,30), another similar debate (Catala, 2013:83-9). 
These institutional replies are against both remedial and primary arguments that 
desire to create a right to secede upon democratic values. Altogether, after these two 
institutional objections, the writer paints the theory as a noninstitutional one.         
 In this section, the third part of the theory of secession is discussed. The 
noninstitutional deontological argument is that a just territory where is uncolonized 
means a multilateral territory, a mere fact because one cannot compensate for the 
harms and the rights of losers, and it appears that this fact demonstrates the state of 
affairs. As a result, there are no utilities and consequences of those acts and/or 
compensation and/or rules. They are about the moral properties of those and nothing 
about consequences. In addition, they are about ignoring the transgression of those 
moral properties that show this condition as a state of affairs. It should be mentioned 
that rights are constructed on the moral properties, and here, the right to secede which 
is based on a moral property is a remedial cure for remedial situations of unilateral or 
consensual cases. The fundamentality of human rights is not about contributing or 
sharing or compensating the merits and demerits, but it is about the mere ends of 
human beings and their respectful personhood. The writer presents an argument that 
is called Martyr Argument which is the pivotal part of the theory and it is constructed 
as follows: One cannot redress for the value of a young martyr who was murdered 
while defending a noncolonizer country; a person who lived in a village located in the 
borderline that was assailed by another country. He passed away not only for 
defending his village and its people in an unjust war, but also for defending the whole 
country. As a matter of fact, his blood has made the boundaries morally valuable. As a 
result, based on this argument, unilateral secession is considered a transgressor of 
other people's rights. We can proudly claim that maybe those borders represent moral 
sainthood as this innocent martyr died for defending and not attacking, for moral 
values and not immoral religious purposes, and for a noncolonizer and not a colonizer 
country. Each inch of the country is painted by the blood of this innocent martyr. Once 
more, those borders are under attack in an unjust war and indeed he has died for his 
village and the whole country.  
 The important points of the argument are mentioned below: 
A is a noncolonizer country that is forced to enter an unjust war started by B, 
B represents an offensive country, 
X is an innocent young person who lives in A, and his village is near the borderline 
where the war takes place. 
Z is a secessionist part of A. 
- B attacks A, 
- X passes away while defending A that includes Z, 
- After his death, Z would secede from A, 
- But X passed away as a result of defending A, 
- Defending A as a whole territory is contrary to withdrawing of a part of that 
territory, 
- Because unilateral withdrawing of Z from A is destroying A as a whole country 
where defended by X, 
- The abovementioned destroying that defending a noncolonizer country by an 
innocent martyr is moral contrary to incentives of Z to be an independent 
territory, 
- Then, how Z could compensate and solve this contrary? 
- It is undeniably true that it is morally impossible. Owing to the fact that there 
is nothing one can do about compensating for the life of an innocent martyr as 
it is about the moral state of the martyrdom and transgressing of martyr's 
blood, 
- Then, it is not morally possible to redress the life of that martyr,  
- As a consequence, unilateral secession is morally unpermitted, except in the 
theory. 
One may argue that there are huge numbers of borders and countries which are 
forcibly involved in wars that have been changed during the hundreds or thousands of 
years. Said otherwise, the current conditions of countries and their borders are not the 
same as the past. As a result, the writer has put the Martyr Argument on ice until it can 
be replaced with other arguments; nevertheless, the writer thinks that this reproof 
reinforces the theory and does not undermine it because one has to distinguish the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of that argument in different cases and also has to determine 
to which country and border the argument belongs. We ought to prioritize our moral 
responsibilities step by step. Following this thought, it will be argued that only the 
RCRSUCCS would be permissible. We can expand the reproving to not only the history 
of countries and their borders which should be legitimate and justified for using the 
Martyr Argument, but also to the noncolonizer countries that are the defensive side of 
the new unjust wars. 
Hence, if A is the most ancient, rich, and democratic country in the world; and it 
knowledgeably, consciously, democratically joins B, where is the newest and poorest 
country with the lowest quality of democratic standards in the globe, by super-majority 
of voters to be a part of B and B welcomes A; then, in another case, Martyr Argument 
is morally sufficient to avert A from seceding from B. We have to acknowledge and 
treat B as a present-day country that the secession of every part of it from B is 
permitted iff it is known as the first permitted way of the remedial cure for remedial 
situations of unilateral cases (RCRSUC), e.g., we can point to the situation after testing 
other political solutions, in hard cases such as genocide and so on or in the second 
permitted way of the remedial cure for remedial situations of consensual cases 
(RCRSCC) through a multilateral, democratic, negotiated and conservative procedure 
with a supermajority vote of all citizens of B to secede a part (or more than one part) 
of B from B.  
In the first permitted way (RCRSUC), the list of those violent cases includes: 1. The 
self-defense of a huge number of people against persistent serious and horrendous 
injustice and the in practice grave violation of basic human rights that could not be 
rectified by other political or legal solutions. The escaping ways for these people are 
unfeasible and unreasonable. For instance, the international justice court to 
condemning the murders for their cruelties means the court is not sufficient and no 
moral person would advise remaining in that territory because there is undoubtedly 
de facto condition of recurring felonies. 2. The second permitted way is the unjust 
seizure of a sovereign territory like usurpation by foreigners, annexation, colonization, 
and occupation. Strongly, the writer believes that only these two reasons are 
permissible. 
The second permitted way (RCRSCC) that has to occur in multiple steps as mentioned 
in the previous paragraphs cannot be acceptable for the ancient heterogeneous 
countries because they are normatively the heritages of humankind, and encouraging 
the citizens of those countries to stay together is a criterion. There are past and future 
generations that get involved into the timeless ancient realms. Next generations who 
live in the hypothetical secessionist region would like to be a part of an antiquity and 
not a newly-established country, and the remainders of the former territory would 
suffer from the political acts of their ancestors. Moreover, those who lived in the past 
had spent their lives on this or that country in different ways and before we could reach 
their level of success, we culturally have to retain their accomplishments. 
 If a group of people secede from a country or join another country as an irredentist 
without these two allowed political models of secession, those political acts violate the 
other populace rights atrociously.  
It is clear that using violence for a right to secede as a manifesto or using it practically 
in the theory, would not be permissible. Let the writer manifest that the right related 
to every inch of a territory which has been independent unilaterally or consensually 
without all-things-concerned arguments that are presented by this article, forcibly or 
non-forcibly, can be considered a right for the remainders to regain that/those 
territory/territories morally and legally.40 To the extent that, theoretically and 
practically, each country that has suffered from secession or irredentism, and the ones 
that have experienced secession or irredentism or they will experience it in the future, 
and those secessionists or irredentists do not practice the theory: RCRSUCCS and 
then, the remainders in all of those cases, have to regain the lost territories; however, 
there are some priorities for regaining a territory: First of all, we have to avoid adding 
more transgression of basic human rights and violence. Moreover, we have to start a 
morally justifiable negotiation on the regaining of the lost territories with those 
colonizers or secessionists. Next, we have to present all-things-considered arguments 
and evidence that prove our claim. Additionally, it is necessary to involve international 
organizations and courts to assess the process. 
It was claimed that it is feasible that secession comes into existence as a remedial cure. 
It is believed that the main reason for insisting on the theory as a remedial cure for 
remedial situations unilaterally or consensually is that in most cases other compatriots 
are impeccable, and the right to secede leads to the dissatisfaction of the remainders 
that believe their multilateral territorial rights are contravened by the secessionists. 
However, secessionists may valuably dwell on the secession and argue that they are 
entitled to do such things in hard cases where the secessionists are temporarily or 
permanently justifiable to be independent and withdraw from a territory. It is 
presumed that if other political improvisations are prepared rationally, we should 
choose those improvisations. To illustrate, humanitarian intervention, revolution, civil 
disobedience, and referendum of constitutional law are good instances of those 
solutions for those conditions. These solutions do not involve the bloodshed of victims 
or the transgression of blameless remainders' rights.  
 
40   For similar view, see: (Margalit & Raz in Goodin and Pettit Eds., 1990:442). 
The writer would not present which political tool is prior to the others and what is its 
political aspects; on the contrary, the main concern is that secession could be used as 
the latest remedial cure in necessary situations where other political tools do not work 
at all. Said otherwise, here the only concern is secession which is not a good strategy 
to solve our political puzzles. It means that if one acknowledges that every unique 
secession movement is shown as a movement that withdraws a territory belonging to 
the whole country with many amoral and moral troubles that have been obtained by 
remainders, secessionists, states and international observers, then, one would earn 
this position that it is a bad political solution that has to be used in circumstances that 
lets the writer call them fatalistic waves.  
Moreover, it has been advised that if one would like to escape from secessionist 
motivations should immediately transplant, deport or transfer some groups of people 
who do not similarly like the majority of a country to other countries which are 
nationally or ethnically or religiously similar, in both consensual or unilateral aspects. 
Let the world become more tribalistic if one would like to save one's sovereignty, 
territory, and nation. The writer avoids creating templates for this tribalistic animal 
husbandry. Based on those normative facts, it is strange when one recognizes those 
movements and one urges and/or compels weaker countries to use this political 
method. However, if secessionists do not attend all-things-considered arguments (the 
RCRSUCCS), then the remainders and states are justifiable to defend themselves 
morally and legally.  
Additionally, there is a moral relation between victims and tyrants in those horrendous 
situations. If victims are victimized by a state and not by other people, then it appears 
that those remainders are profoundly unhappy with cruelties, powerlessly rescue 
losers from oppressions and motivationally restrain persecutors from persecution. In 
those atrocities, moral wrongness supervenes upon tyrants and not the 
remainders,41 especially in undemocratic states since those states are undemocratic 
and the citizens are not a part of state decisions and acts. They have to strive to build 
up a democratic state instead of violating other remainders’ rights by secessionists’ 
prompting. As an outcome of discriminations and ferocity and mostly due to wield 
legal authority fitting punishment is our reflection of this situation, both by 
international courts and/or national supreme courts.  
Next, the situations in which secession in the RCRSUC is permanent are explained. In 
the RCRSUC, victims can secede immediately; although, the temporary secession can 
be more effective. This is leading us to consider secession in the RCRSUC as a 
conservatively temporary antidote. Imagine R, a vast country in which three ethnic 
groups live: X, Y, Z, which occupy 70%, 20%, 10% of the territory and population. 
Because of a disagreement, X unjustifiably attacks Z, targeting 60% of its population 
and this turpitude makes X commit an infringement on absolute rights of Zs. 18% of 
Ys approve the strike and only 2% of Ys disagree with the strike. In this no-win 
situation, ethnic cleansing will presumably occur if nobody engages in the trouble. 
Practically, Z ought to secede from X and Y in a short time if it is considered an 
adequate answer to proscribe Xs. The main reason is that genocide is going to arise 
strategically and timely among many individuals. Probably international society is 
going to intervene in this massacre that forbid Xs; however, unfortunately, it is not 
clear whether the huge number of Xs would turn to crime and other political provisions 
 
41 For comparing, see: (Chandhoke, 2014a:6). 
like intervention or revolution are adequate or not. It is obvious that Zs have to secede 
from Xs and Ys at once. There are no political, cultural, national or societal reasons to 
prohibit this moral choice. Respecting and saving moral beings are the first-order 
obligations. Altogether, in the similar cases, a group of people can unilaterally secede 
from other parts of the territory as soon as they can. 
Another noncolonial hypothetical case is when the supermajority of a country parts 
and the population of a country are recognized as M, N, and L that would like to 
separate from a minority part and the population of that country, identified as U. In 
this case, M, N, L cannot unilaterally secede from U, unless through RCRSUC. In 
addition, they must not consensually secede from U on condition that it is permissible 
as RCRSCC. 
There is another note, but it is not focal point of secession. The point is that secession 
is not only business of ethnic groups, but also, it could be a concern of other kinds of 
groups i.e. there could be religious or social or other types of groups who are motivated 
to secede from a country. The writer has categorized these groups as the Plebiscitarian 
Right Theories and it is true the Martyr Argument has to apply to these groups; and 
the writer thinks it satisfy the criteria. 
The ultimate point of this part of the theory is that we have to keep in mind the untrue 
judgments of the RCRSUC of secession. The writer ought to highlight a note that is 
connected to the RCRSUC. We have to keep in mind that those attacks and 
transgressions should not maintain any connection to secession, the varieties of which 
appear to be reasons for those secessionists to withdraw their territory unilaterally and 
construct a new state permanently. In a practical reason: 
F is an absolute majority population and territory of a country, 
M is a minority population and territory of that country,  
Ns are others, 
- M unjustifiably, immorally and unilaterally would secede from F, that is not 
advised in the theory,  
- F attacks M with the consent of Ns,  
- Ceteris paribus, 
- Consequently, there is a former connection between the transgressions and 
secession, 
- Secession should not to be permitted. 
- Because in this case, the act of secession is self-defeating. 
- Therefore, in this situation, the writer recommends other political solutions. 
As a result of the theory, it appears that the RCRSUCCS could not be presented easily 
and practically, but one could only imagine the right to secede ethically in the 
RCRSUCCS. We ought to persuade everyone to follow this theory and foil the acts of 
those who do not account for this moral defense. 
It was noted in this article that the theory is considered as a curative rule of two models 
of circumstances. What is the legal aspect of the RCRSUCC? 
 Legalization of Secession 
The constitutional aspect of the theory forces the writer to think that the 
constitutionalizing of secession42 remains a futile striving. There are horrific cases in 
which the states do not extremely obey the law and breach the law. It is unwise for us 
to think that in the RCRSUC, a brutalist state will obey the rules within the bounds of 
constitutions, even though if we would constitutionalize secession as the RCRSCC, a 
multilateral, democratic, negotiated and conservative procedure with the super-
majority votes of the whole country, would become a ridiculous and pointless 
provision since we are required to codify the numerous provisions. From the 
philosophical aspect of international law, it is fruitful to institutionalize the right to 
secede in the international legal systems.43 In the case of RCRSUCC, we require an 
international observer that obeys the extreme moral codes and has generated those 
codes through the well-entrenched provisions. There is a moral algorithm to fathom 
that whether a right to secede is morally permissible for an exceptional case which can 
be feasible in international law or not.  The algorithm is as follows: 
1. A case satisfies the RCRSUCCS theory, 
2. If 1 is true, then it has to be permitted in the international law both practically 
and morally, 
3. Whether there is or could be a case that satisfies RCRSUCCS theory, then we 
shall declare it as a provision in international law. 
4. International law and organizations shall impose this law, 
5. In every particular case, we very conservatively have to ask if this case can be 
convincing as a type of RCRSUCCS theory, 
 
42 For constitutional secession, see: (Sunstein, 1991, 2001), (Buchanan, 1991:127-49, 2017a), 
(Weinstock, 2000, 2001), (Pérez & Sanjaume, 2013:5-7), (Kreptul, 2003:55-62), (Jovanovic, 2007), 
(Corlett, 1998:121-6), (Ewin, 1995:348-9), (Aronovitch, 2000:33-5); opponents (Sunstein, 1991, 2001), 
1. The Perverse Effects Problem (Sunstein, 1991:648, 2001:355), (Philpot, 2000:127-30) 2. Strategic 
Bargaining Problem (Sunstein, 1991:666), reply (Shorten, 2014:100-12), 3. The Legal Forms 
Inconsistency Problem (Sunstein:2001:354), 4. The Impartial Enforcement Criterion Problem (Philpot, 
2000:125-6), 5. The Possibility of Realization Problem (ibid:130); proponents (Shorten, 2014), 
(Norman, 2003, 2006:181-214), (Kreptul, 2003:87-92), (Jovanovic, 2007:182-95), (Weinstock, 2001). 
43 For the international legal secession, see: (Buchanan in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997a, 
1997b:32,41-4, in Lehning Ed., 1998b, 2004, 2014, 2017a,), (Philpott, 2000:115-25), (Altman & 
Wellman, 2009:58-67), (Weller, 2008:23-6), (Vidmar, 2010), (Day, 2012), (Weinstock, 2000:257-60), 
(Copp, 1998), (Kohen, Ed., 2006), (Lefkowitz, 2018); problems (Copp, 1998:232-5), 1. Metropolitan 
Power Problem (Buchanan, 2017a), 2. The Saltwater Decolonization Problem (ibid), 3. Impartial 
Enforcement Criterion Problem (Philpott in Moore Ed., 1998:86, 2000:116-9), 4. Trial Order Doctrine 
Problem (Roth, 2015:411-3), 5. The Preserve Effects Problem (Philpott in Moore Ed., 1998:89-92, 
2000:119-23), 6. The Deliberative Democracy Problem (Buchanan, 2004:359-60), 6. Realization 
Problem (Philpott in Moore Ed., 1998:92-3, 2000:123-5), (Chandhoke, 2010); a proponent (Buchanan 
in Hannum & Babbitt Eds., 2006). 
 
 
6. This legal right should not be arbitrary. It has to be regarded for those who live 
in that especial country as a whole. Other states, international organizations 
and their benefits are valueless. As a result, it is a momentous idea to see the 
ideal observer that focuses on an especial country and does not focus on the 
others. 
7.  1-6 appear to be like the international courts that are reasonably justified to 
distinguish the truth from lies. 
 
Conclusion 
The writer thinks that the theory - Multilateralism, National Debates of Secession, 
Weaknesses of the Institutional Democratic Secessionist Arguments, Martyr 
Argument, Regaining, Double Remedialism, Last Solution, Animal Husbandry, 
Supervenient Note, the Temporary or Permanent, U Minority, differential groups, 
Self-defeating, and Legalization - is a panacea for the territorial, national, rightful and 
legal questions, troubles and debates of secession philosophically. The writer believes 
no philosophical theory that can escape from the theory that is mentioned in this 
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